Book Review: Reset: Iran, Turkey and America's Future

I'm slowly but surely catching up on my book reviews.  So here is another one.  See, while I was in between blogs, so to speak, I was still reading.  I've actually cut back just of late, since I have a big multi-day Spanish midterm and a big midterm paper for my Middle Eastern History class that are hanging heavy on my mind.  Tough to enjoy the reading of non-related materials when you have heavy tasks to do.  The joys of college life, eh?

Source: Amazon.com

Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future, by Stephen Kinzer.

This book was among the bibliographic citations that were included in the seminar class I took from Dr. Omar Kader a couple years back.  I recently ran across my document packet from that class, and decided to scope out some of the offerings to see if there were any viable options that I might read “on the fly” (via audiobook).  Reset was one of the few that fit that description, and so I decided that I might as well put it on the top of my reading list.  I also did this because I am currently in a Modern Middle Eastern History class in school, and the topics covered in this book seemed relevant to my studies.

The book covers the subjects of Turkish history, Iranian history, and U.S. relations with both.  The history covered is fairly recent when viewing the span of years in which both Iran and Turkey have existed, and only covers the past 200 years or so, with a majority of focus on the last 100 years.  I recall most clearly the material on Turkey that is covered since the rise of Ata Turk, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic, and then for Iran I recall the material on Reza Shah, the father of Muhammad Reza Shah (Shah being their title, I believe it is analogous to “king”) who was deposed in 1979.  If you know your history at all, you’ll recall that the U.S. supported Muhammad Reza Shah’s government to excess.  That fact came back to bite us when he was deposed by fundamentalist Muslims who saw how decadent that misguided man’s actions were.  The Iranian hostage crisis followed, in which the U.S. embassy was overrun and those inside taken hostage for over 400 days.  It was a dark time for U.S. Mid-East relations.

Both Ata Turk and Reza Shah’s backstories were fascinating to read.  Ata Turk defied the British during World War I, leading Turkish forces to victory at the Dardanelles when the Brits tried to invade the region and link up with the Russians in order to cut the Ottoman Empire out of the war.  Known as “Kemal” at the time, the man who would come to lead Turkey was brash and thoroughly un-Islamic in his women chasing and hard drinking.  He also had some things in common with Vladimir Lenin, in that he did not kow-tow to his country’s religious heritage, but instead openly ridiculed it.  This led him to institute policies that decreased the power of the Islamic faith in its traditional role of power in Turkey, and eventually led to the secularization of that nation.  Though it is a Muslim country, and is still far behind in many aspects of tolerance and equal rights, Turkey is probably the most liberal and open Muslim state in the Middle East today.  Much of this is thanks to the man who would take the title “Ata Turk” (or father of the Turks).

The story of Reza Shah is no less interesting, though it follows a different path.  Iran did not take to the Shah’s reforms as Turkey did to Ata Turk’s, a major reason being that Iran is a Shi ‘ite nation and that particular faith takes a less accommodating view to broad sweeping reform instituted at the hands of one man.  The Shah also struggled with the problem that the British had a controlling interest in his country; specifically that the British had a near monopoly on the nation’s vast oil reserves.  Iran was originally only getting a 16% cut of the profits from oil extracted from its soil when the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was first founded.  Though Iran did get slight increments in this percentage, they were still at a distinctly unfair disadvantage.  When the U.S. cut a deal with the newly created state of Saudi Arabia in the late 1940s for a 50/50 split, Iran felt jealous and wanted to throw off British interference.

In part, this oil crisis led to the election of Mohammad Mosaddeq, who was the Iranian nation’s closest brush with a democratically elected leader within most of its established history.  However, when Mosaddeq nationalized the Iranian oil, he incurred the wrath of the Brits, who tried to have him thrown out.  They failed, and then they turned to the United States/CIA to do the job.  The grandson of Teddy Roosevelt accomplished this for them.  This was during the Eisenhower administration, and “Ike” felt no compunctions about removing a troublesome Middle Eastern nationalist if it kept the oil flowing.  Besides, he was asked to do it by an old ally, Winston Churchill.

There is more to the story, but I can’t give it all away.  I don’t have time and you’d be better served by reading the book.  Anyway, this is just a small sampling of what the book has by way of historical content for these two nations.  Also covered are such topics as the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, which ousted the aforementioned Muhammad Reza Shah, and also the origin of the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia (in which Franklin D. Roosevelt met with the king of the newly created Saudi state and made a long lasting alliance with that nation - the story about the Saudi’s visit to Roosevelt is full of interesting details, including a tidbit about how the king’s son threatened a U.S. naval officer in order that he should be allowed to join with the ship’s crew and view decidedly non-Islam-approved Western films featuring scantily clothed - for the time - women). 

There is also material on the U.S.’s turbulent relationship with Israel.  This brings me to the book’s point.  It is, after all, not just a nice historical text, but also comes with a message.  The author, Stephen Kinzer, advocates a reanalysis of the United States’ relationship’s in the Middle East.  He puts forth the point that both Saudi Arabia and Israel were allies of a somewhat convenient nature during the Cold War, and that this relationship has turned potentially poisonous since the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s.  He points out that Saudi Arabia has been both a major source of oil, and has in return been one of the largest war material buyers on the United States’ client list.  Just recently, I heard a news story saying we were selling the Saudis another $30 billion worth of weapons, and so this claim is not at all surprising. 

The author also points out that the Saudis helped fund many anti-Communist programs during the late years of the Cold War, including the Iran-Contra debacle and the Afghanistan counter-Soviet Mujahedeen group during the occupation of that nation by the Russians.  Kinzer argues that these were necessary steps at the time for the participants, but does not necessarily suit the U.S.’s self-image of noble world defender.  Further, Saudi Arabia is based on a religious branch of Islam that is not particularly fond of the West, namely Wahhabi-ism.  Kinzer points out that the Saudis keep their more radical Muslims from turning against the decadence of the entrenched Saudi monarchy/government by sending them off to study in near abroad regions and participate in the “spreading of the faith.”  He also points out that the majority of the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks were Saudi citizens.  This is not by coincidence.  After all, Bin Laden was Saudi born and, to a certain extent up until he began full-scale terrorist activities, funded by Saudis.

The author does even more damage to the U.S.’s world view when discussing our relations with Israel.  He points out that the Israelis were used to train forces that were fighting Communist regimes throughout the world during the Cold War when our Congress specifically forbade our nation from being involved.  The Israelis were our dirty-deed-doers, so to speak.  They sold weapons to and trained some of the most brutal repression forces of Central and South America, including the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and Panamanian strong-man Manuel Noriega.  The Israelis are, without doubt, the premier small-scale insurgency and counter-insurgency experts in the world, and we put them in that position and tacitly approved of their every step on the road to becoming so.

As an aside: please note before sending me hate-mail that I am not advocating that the U.S. break with Israel, or that we should stop supporting them, or that there is any way shape or form any excuse for anti-Semitism.  I am saying/agreeing with the book’s author that the U.S. position vis-a-vis Israel at present is not a healthy one.  This is how the book explains it, and it is what I have learned from my own studies.  If religious questions and historical precedent are put aside simply in favor of the facts, Israel and the U.S. are presently in an embrace that should make an honest person blush. If we claim to be better than that, we should act the part.  That’s all I’m saying.  Ok, now back to the book review.

As stated, the author points out that all this Cold War necessary collusion is in the past now, and the U.S. should be looking to re-evaluate its interests in the region.  He says that he does not advocate a complete break with either Saudi Arabia or Israel, but that we should change our relationship to suit the realities of the 21st Century.  He also says we should change our policies toward Turkey and Iran. 

His point on Iran was especially intriguing to me.  Kinzer points out that when Nixon made his approaches to China in the late 1960s/early 1970s, the Chinese were not exactly behaving themselves in America’s best interest either.  They were supplying arms to the North Vietnamese who were busy killing U.S. soldiers in that country.  However, the thaw of relations between the U.S. and China was a good thing in the long run (though it may be argued that we are in too deep with them and getting deeper every day, but that is another story), and Kinzer proposes that a change in policy from hostility to guarded openness with Iran may be in our best interests in the Middle East in the long run as well.  He does not advocate that we go about things with Iran lightly, or that we should politically “get into bed with them,” as it were, but that we have more in common with the Iranian people than we think, and our hostility toward them is counter-productive.  Personally, I can’t help but think he has a good point.  We don’t have to be friends right away, but making the Iranians - and the entire Muslim population for that matter, but that is another story - into our allies would go a long way toward stabilizing relations in the Middle East and would be of great benefit to our economy in the long run.  A military solution will not work permanently.  Experts in our own Defense Department agree on this.  We’ll only put a deeper gulf between us and spend billions more dollars that we don’t have.

When all is said and done, I’d say that I liked the book and found the time spent reading it was worth my effort.  I’d recommend it, with the caveat that it can be viewed as both a nice historical text and also as a potential policy change suggestion that can be somewhat controversial in certain circles, both in the U.S. and abroad.  In defense of the book, I say: take it either way you prefer, or take it both ways.  Or don’t.  Nobody is twisting your arm here.  After all, it’s still a semi-free country.

Learn more about Reset: Iran, Turkey and America's Future on Amazon.com

My parting comment:

Source: Funnyjunkz.com / Funny Signs

It may not be a DOT sign, but it ought to be.  And the afterthought-like nature of the bridge's status is the real selling point to me.  Someday I want a sign like this posted at the edge of my driveway.  When I live in a big fancy mansion on a hill.  And have billions of dollars from my successful writing/lecturing career.  And sleep naked on a pile of money with many beautiful ladies (like that joke from the Simpsons).  Ah, I'm short on sleep and getting off on a tangent here...